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The Makiran Underground Army: Kastom Mysticism and Ontology 
Politics in South-east Solomon Islands 
Michael W. Scott 
 
Calls for a Makiran state and the state of being Makiran 
On August 4, 2007 the following news brief appeared in the Solomon Times Online 
under the headline ‘Kirakira Residents Awaiting “Mystery Army”’: 
 
It has been reported that the residents of Kira Kira town have been waiting, for 
the past few days, for the appearance of a platoon believed to be a secret army 
trained in the jungles of Makira by specialized Western military personnels 
[sic].  Sources from Kira Kira told the SIBC [Solomon Islands Broadcasting 
Corporation] that the army was to have been part of celebrations to mark the 
provinces [sic] Second Appointed Day.  The source from Kira Kira stated that 
the belief of a secret provincial army has been actively promoted by senior 
citizens of the provincial town, including Provincial Assembly Members … 
Makira Ulawa Province has been, over the past few years, calling for 
independence from the rest of Solomon Islands.  It is still unclear whether this 
idea of a secret army has anything to do with its desire to secede … 
[R]esidents are eagerly anticipating the arrival of the secret platoon, which is 
said to be on the 17th of August.  The 17th of August is also the Province’s 
‘Chief’s Empowerment Day’.  The Makira-Ulawa provincial government has 
moved the celebrations of its Second Appointed Day to August 17th to 
coincide with the event. (Sao 2007) 
 
With the aim of investigating earlier rumours and accounts of this same ‘secret 
army’, I conducted a total of ten months of field research in 2003 and 2006 on the 
island of Makira, the southern-most large island in the Solomons archipelago.  
Building on my 1992-1993 doctoral research, I worked primarily in the linguistically 
and administratively-defined area known as Arosi at the northwest end of Makira, but 
also east of Arosi in the Makira/Ulawa provincial centre at Kirakira and in the 
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national capital, Honiara, on Guadalcanal.  Recurrent themes I encountered included: 
the idea that the army is stationed underground in a subterranean base, the ‘door’ to 
which is located at Rohu on the northwest coast of Arosi; that the army is equipped 
with super-normal technology devised by Euro-Americans with the aid of dwarf-like 
Makiran autochthons called kakamora; that together the army and the kakamora are 
the guardians of a pure Makiran language and kastom (tradition or custom) that has 
become obscured and depleted among Makirans in the surface world; that Solomon 
Mamaloni, the deceased Arosi-born former Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, is still 
alive and in communication with the army, preparing to lead it above ground; and that 
this emergence will bring prosperity, the restoration of true Makiran kastom, and 
political autonomy for Makira. 
 
 
 
I found also that different Makirans engage with the figure of the underground 
army in different ways and at different times.  A small number of Arosi, some of 
whom I was able to interview, say they have visited the underground and have there 
received revelatory instruction about a momentous imminent future for Makira.  One 
man, for example, described how white Americans had contacted him in his 
gardening area and led him, by means imperceptible to his bemused senses, into a vast 
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monolithic complex he supposed was the underground.  Another man confided that he 
had once stumbled inside after treading inadvertently on a crocodile’s tooth, causing a 
hidden point of access suddenly to open up before him.  The accounts I gathered from 
such initiates, although by no means consonant in every way, share a consistent claim: 
they assert that the army, in accordance with a divine plan, wills for Makira to 
become autonomous as either a federal state or an independent nation that will be 
governed by the restored true Makiran kastom held in trust by the army and the 
kakamora.  When this occurs, abundant resources and wealth will come out from and 
flow to the island and provide the foundation for Makiran development and regional 
ascendancy. 
Having been privileged with this esoteric knowledge, initiates often feel 
compelled to seek out potentially receptive auditors, such as clergy, family members, 
earnest truth-seekers, or anthropologists with whom they might share what they have 
seen and learned in order to help Makirans prepare for what is to come.  Even so, 
however, they also feel, as one man put it, as if under a ‘taboo’ not to ‘spoil’ the army 
by talking indiscreetly or lightly about it to just anyone.  These Arosi are in dialogue 
with the army as an agent that makes demands on them and catches them up in an 
already transpiring process of kastom resurgence.  They experience the army as 
drawing them into a movement that, if not yet a popular movement, is literally a 
groundswell, the unfolding of an irresistible force, a divine plan for Makira that is at 
work in their island and in all Makirans whether or not they will or recognize it. 
Despite the burdens of discretion borne by initiates, their experiences and 
attempts to understand and communicate them are often the sources—usually at many 
hands’ remove—of what other Arosi have heard and repeat about the underground 
army.  But for this uninitiated majority, who say they are simply perplexed and 
uncertain about what they have heard, the army is not a consistent focus of attention.  
Some are intermittently motivated to look into the matter, to question others about 
what they have heard or seen, even to attempt to make contact with army personnel.  
Such interest in and inclination to give credence to the notion of the underground 
varies greatly, not only from person to person, but with respect to particular 
individuals over time.  Mirroring the ways in which the army itself is expected to 
behave, talk about it tends to emerge during times of uncertainty or transition—such 
as the run-up to the Chiefs Empowerment Day described in the news brief quoted 
above—but recedes back underground during periods of relative regularity. 
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Given this diversity and fluctuation of orientations, no single interpretation 
can exhaustively analyze the Makiran underground army or even isolate what it most 
fundamentally is about.  It invites and rewards multiple angles of contemplation and 
interrogation both from Solomon Islanders and from international researchers.  With 
this irreducibility in mind, in this chapter I work towards fuller explication of the 
opening news brief by examining the figure of the underground army as a clear 
example of how ‘local cultural heritage’ in the Pacific continues to be ‘a central 
element in political innovation in and beyond the local’ (Rio and Hviding, this 
volume).  Specifically, I explore how the figure of the underground has become a site 
at which some Makirans are encountering what they experience as Makiran kastom—
translatable as a ‘local cultural heritage’ (cf. Lindstrom, this volume)—in ways that 
are informing political innovations and aspirations for alternatives to the current 
Solomon Islands state, especially aspirations for greater Makiran self-determination.  
In so doing I present ethnographic data that co-develop three interwoven theses.  
Although not treated strictly in sequence, these theses may be summarized as follows. 
First, I argue that the underground army is a recent figuration of the ways in 
which some Arosi experience what they call the ringeringe auhenua (autochthonous 
way/custom; Pijin, kastom lo) of Makira not only as a set of values and practices, but 
also—even primarily—as an essential quality intrinsic to a socially emergent pan-
Makiran category of being.  Makiran kastom, and the underground as one of its many 
images, are coming to signify the agency—the power (mena)—of a distinctive 
Makiran ontology.  For many Makirans this kastom is apprehended, less as an object 
or possession than as an alienated self, a past and obscured but nevertheless still 
present and recoverable Makiran character and efficacy within a continuity of being 
that encompasses the island, its truly autochthonous people, and its inherent nature or 
way.  Within this insular continuity of being, the relationship between the Makiran 
person and Makiran kastom is therefore non-dual; the latter is always both self and 
other to the former, eternally internal and renewable even while historically 
externalized and subject to depletion (cf. R. Scott, this volume). 
Second, I argue that this newer Makiran category of being, with its singular 
insular Makiran kastom, is forming up in the likeness of, even while tending to 
rupture, older matrilineally defined categories, each with its territory-specific kastom.  
Increasing Arosi consciousness of pan-Makiran being and kastom must be 
understood, in fact, as constituting a transformation of Arosi models of ontology that 
  5 
both produces a scaled-up analogue to an Arosi matrilineage and has the potential to 
subordinate matrilineal difference to a higher unity.1 
This higher Makiran unity is coming into being among and in mutually 
determining relationships with diverse but sociologically comparable processes of 
region or island-based ontology consciousness in neighbouring Solomon Islands 
contexts (cf. Allen 2009; Scales 2007; White 2001).  Accordingly, my third thesis is 
that, as part of this semiotics, the figure of the underground is a referent through 
which some Makirans imagine and articulate—not simply what anthropologists have 
sometimes critiqued as a strategic kastom politics in which elements of a kastom 
repertoire are selectively and opportunistically deployed (e.g. Keesing 1989; 
Tonkinson 1993)—but, more accurately, a kastom ontology with an attendant 
ontology politics.  By this I mean a political theory according to which legitimate 
power in Makira, especially the power to understand and administer Makiran kastom, 
must be inborn not simply acquired and is thus, according to some, the rightful 
province of genuine Makirans only.  Such a theory can give rise, furthermore, to what 
I will term a kastom mysticism the goal of which is similar in some respects to the 
goal of reunion with divinity, conceived of as a higher self, explicit in many religious 
and philosophical versions of metaphysical monism.  Here, however, the goal is 
sympathetic insight into kastom through reconnection with the core essence of the 
island as greater essential self.  Understanding themselves to be potential conduits of 
the greater kastom in which they inhere, some Makirans are seeking to be guided and 
to guide other Makirans by accessing the kastom within—both within the 
underground and within themselves.  Their hope is to establish a Makiran state 
founded on the state of being Makiran, to realize true Makiran-ness as the fulfilment 
of an ontological condition that is simultaneously a divinely ordained destiny (for 
discussion of comparable processes among some Malaitans, see Kabutaulaka 2001). 
For the ongoing anthropological enquiry into the relationship between kastom 
and agency (e.g. Otto and Pedersen 2005), the relevant resulting observation is that 
many Makirans do not experience themselves as free agents in relationship to the 
traditions of their island.  Kastom is not something these Makirans know as a finite 
cultural heritage they own or over which they exercise full control.  Even efforts at 
kastom recovery and codification cannot wholly capture it, and it is never alienable.  
Makirans may lose kastom, but kastom cannot lose them.  It enfolds them and calls 
them back, revealing itself not only to them but also in them as part of their very 
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natures as Makirans.  What Daniel de Coppet’s (1985: 81) consultant, Aliki 
Nono‘ohimae Eerehau, said of land among the ‘Are‘are of central and southern 
Malaita applies to kastom among Arosi: kastom owns people.  The agency of the 
Makiran person and the agency encountered as kastom are two sides of the same 
ontological coin, in internal dialogue with one another through—among other points 
of reference—the figure of the underground. 
As I conclude, however, this does not mean that there are no strategic 
operators on Makira employing kastom rhetoric to advance personal or local 
community interests.  Rather, it suggests that even the obvious political manipulation 
of an icon of the force of kastom—such as the underground army—may sometimes 
also be an attempt to respond to a perceived vocation from that force.  Calculated 
appeals to the notion of the underground may, at the same time, be the results of 
complex existential processes of working out the demands and promises of being 
Makiran and how best to lead Makira by following its dictates.  Returning to the 
situation reported in the Solomon Times Online for August 4, 2007, I examine the case 
of one particular Makiran politician whose career illustrates this point.  Strongly 
implicated in the fostering of expectations that celebration of a Chiefs Empowerment 
Day would occasion an epiphany of the underground, this politician and his activities 
challenge analytical attempts to distinguish between a strategic kastom operator and a 
kastom mystic.  His discourse and aims, I show, are exemplary of how political 
innovations in Solomon Islands involve the movement of local cultural heritage back 
and forth, not only between the seeming opposites of instrumentalist and essentialist 
orientations, but also between the similarly elided spatial and processual opposites of 
centre and periphery, state and grassroots, top-down and bottom-up. 
 
From matrilineal ancestors to underground army of the ‘Motherland’ 
Among Arosi the idea that Makira is the site of a secret and extraordinary 
subterranean army is both old and new.  Constituted as the colonial and neo-colonial 
transformations of many antecedent transformations of Arosi ideas about the power of 
autochthony, the underground army has long been a familiar element within a 
cumulative and dynamic modern Makiran folklore. 
In its fully militarized form, the notion that a prodigious power somehow 
inheres within the island of Makira seems to have originated in the context of Maasina 
Rule, a post-World War II socio-political movement prevalent in the central and 
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south-east Solomons c. 1944-1952.2  On Makira, Maasina Rule had entailed rumours 
that Americans fighting in the Pacific had established a modern ‘town’ in a vast 
hollowed-out cavern inside the island.  These Americans, according to some rumours, 
were not foreigners but the descendants of Makiran women taken away by Euro-
American explorers and labour traders in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries (Scott  
2007a: 105-129; 2008).  At the height of the movement, some Arosi had hoped that 
these returning matrilineal cousins would assist Solomon Islanders to end British rule 
and achieve development and prosperity. 
When I first conducted fieldwork in Arosi in the early 1990s, most people had 
dismissed these older rumours of an underground town—as well as other aspects of 
Maasina Rule—as having been misguided.  I was surprised, therefore, when I 
returned in 2003 to find many people eager to discuss fresh rumours of what they 
termed a ‘security force’ said to come and go through a ‘door’ in the limestone cliffs 
at Rohu on the north-west end of the island.  Alleged evidence of its activities 
included: nightly sorties over Makira by small low-flying aircraft between 1999 and 
2002; glimpses in the bush and at Rohu of unknown people in military uniform; eerie 
lights coming from offshore and under the sea; passing submarines—some 
camouflaged as large marine animals—and a mysterious ship bearing the word 
‘Motherland’ that seemed to be keeping the island under surveillance. 
Some people furthermore suggested that this security force might be operating 
in league with beings known as kakamora (alternatively, pwapwaronga or 
pwapwaangora).  Arosi folktales and purported eyewitness testimonies describe 
kakamora as small autochthonous people unique to Makira who live in caves and 
sinkholes and possess incredible physical strength, keen senses, and all-knowing 
wisdom (Fox 1924: 138-147).  Some narratives suggest a link between kakamora and 
the preservation of the material integrity of Makira.  In the most well-known tale 
about them, they prop up the western end of the island when it is about to sink (Fox 
1924: 290); in another, they construct a sea wall to prevent inundation (Scott 2008: 
143-146, 157).  They also figure in at least one Arosi matrilineage origin narrative.  
All such narratives entail claims to autochthony through matrilineal descent from 
diverse phenomena said to have originated with the island.  One example, which I 
have analyzed more fully elsewhere (Scott 2007a: 139-141), identifies a progenitor as 
having been a kakamora.  In all of these representations, kakamora personify and 
reiterate the claim made in the Arosi name for Makira—Hanuato‘o—which means 
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‘The Strong Island’.  Brought into relationship with renewed rumours about the 
underground army, however, these motifs appear to be undergoing reproductive 
reinterpretation in assertions that it is the kakamora who have taught the underground 
army its advanced military technology and have endowed it with their own super-
normal attributes: omniscience, the ability to become invisible, and the prophylactic 
powers intrinsic to their autochthony. 
In retrospect, I ought not to have been surprised by these reframings of the 
idea of the underground.  In many respects, they make good moral and mythic Arosi 
sense as responses to the so-called ‘ethnic tension’, the period of civil conflict that 
disrupted Solomon Islands between 1998 and 2003 (Dinnen 2002; Fraenkel 2004; 
Kabutaulaka 2002; Moore 2004).  Among the many causes of this conflict—which 
was localized mainly in and around Honiara—were disputes between those who see 
themselves as customary landowners on Guadalcanal and those they see as usurpers, 
especially economic migrants from the island of Malaita.  The escalation of these 
disputes into coup, armed combat, and murder—conjoined with regional concerns 
about possible terrorist infiltration in an ‘unstable’ situation—resulted in the 
intervention of the Australia-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) in July 2003, a mission that remains in place today (Dinnen 2008; 
Kabutaulaka 2005; Moore 2007). 
As onlookers to these events, my Arosi consultants have tended to sympathize 
with Guadalcanal land-claimants and to stereotype Malaitans negatively as inherently 
aggressive and grasping of both government positions and other people’s land and 
resources (cf. Dureau 1998; Gray 2002; Kabutaulaka 2001; Keesing 1994; Scales 
2007).  With the disruption of central government services and the breakdown of law 
and order that occurred during the ‘tension’, many Makirans experienced a heightened 
sense of vulnerability to the kinds of encroachments and depredations they believed 
Malaitans were perpetrating nearby on Guadalcanal and might soon bring to Makira.  
In this context, the old idea of a secret subterranean realm acquired new relevance as 
the domain of a security force, the purpose of which is to protect Makira from 
precisely this type of threat. 
But the Maasina Rule-era rumour of a modern American town flourishing 
inside the island is not the only figure of power in the land informing current 
elaborations of the Makiran underground army.  Equally important are Arosi 
assumptions about ancestors and their relationship to the Christian God, matrilineal 
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land, and kastom.  It is chiefly as a scaled-up transformation of these assumptions, in 
fact, that the army acquires its character as a figure of a pan-Makiran kastom integral 
to a pan-Makiran ontology.3 
Arosi experience their matrilineages as the bearers of autonomously arising, 
ontologically discrete categories of being.  Arosi representations of primordiality 
depict diverse autochthonous phenomena—rocks, snakes, birds, spirits of the land, 
kakamora and other quasi-human beings—as existing independently in the island.  In 
their initial condition, these originary entities lived in pre-social isolation from one 
another.  Through processes of transformation and interrelation, they produced fully 
human beings whose activities of reproduction, place-making, and exchange gave rise 
to the diverse Makiran matrilineages emplaced in their theoretically unique and 
mutually exclusive territories.  Despite these transformations and ongoing 
relationships, however, Arosi assert that each matrilineage—figured as an ever-
extending umbilical cord—constitutes the unbroken continuation of a single, pure and 
autochthonous category of being. 
A corollary to this Arosi experience of Makiran matrilineages as poly-
ontological is an experience of Makiran kastom as territory-specific and thus likewise 
fundamentally plural.  According to closely guarded genealogically ordered 
narratives, each matrilineage shaped and was shaped by the land that became its 
territory.  Such narratives tell how lineage ancestors established villages, cleared areas 
for making gardens, planted or tended fruit and nut trees, and enshrined the bones of 
their dead.  As these lineage pioneers came into mutually eliciting and defining 
relationships with the land and everything in it—especially a cumulative body of 
ancestors—they received, divined, and innovated the precepts and practices now 
thought of as the ringeringe auhenua, the kastom of each lineage in its land.4  
Conditioned by a contingent matrilineal history, each territory-specific kastom entails 
distinguishing elements: conventions for rapport with ancestors; practical and verbal 
taboos associated with specific locales; a repertoire of personal names linking people 
to places, etc.  These differences in ringeringe manifest the ontological differences 
thought to persist among the Makiran matrilineages, understood as transformations of 
an original plurality of island beings. 
With their representations of matrilineal ontology and kastom as both 
fundamentally plural, Arosi accounts of how fully humanized and territorialized 
matrilineages came into being furthermore imply an ongoing relationship between 
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kastom and agency, within which agency is always both categorical and personal.  
Being an integral dimension of each ontological category, kastom may find expression 
in its category as a whole or in any of its parts.  The territory-specific ringeringe of 
each matrilineage thus transpires continuously as the category interacts with itself via 
the fundamentally consubstantial agents of territorial land, local non-ancestral powers, 
plants, animals, ancestral pioneers, and the dead.  These interactions parse and re-
parse ringeringe as unique categorical character into ringeringe as tradition 
(knowable precepts, institutions, figural designs, practices, etc.), while simultaneously 
defining certain ancestors as those who, by their personal agency, innovated specific 
elements of heritage (names, shrines, locales, dances, taboos).  Socially transmissible 
ringeringe is not the work of autonomous individuals; it is the product of a complex 
synergy among diversely manifesting agents within each category whose interactions 
(encounters, events, dreams, divinatory communications) and relations with other 
categories transmute essential categorical properties into propositions for living and 
cultural forms.5 
All of that said, however, it is also the case that Arosi interpretations of 
Christianity are among a number of colonial and neo-colonial factors that clearly have 
the potential to subordinate these essential matrilineal, territorial and kastom 
differences to more encompassing levels of ontological unity.  They often do so, 
however, in ways that reposition these older, still socially relevant differences as 
secondary rather than primary aspects of being (Scott 2005). 
Arosi adhere to three main Christian denominations, and there remain today 
only a few elderly people who were not born into Christianity as their most immediate 
ancestral religion.  Those living in the former Council Area still commonly referred to 
as Arosi 1 in the north and east are primarily Anglican, while most people in the 
former Council Area known as Arosi 2 in the south and west belong to the South Sea 
Evangelical Church (SSEC).  Seventh-day Adventists (SDA) constitute a small 
minority cross-cutting this main denominational and former geopolitical divide.6 
Apart from the SDA minority (see note 7 below), most Arosi—both laypeople 
and clergy—have long been at work on ethno-theological projects of rapprochement 
between their understandings of the pre-Christian past and Christianity (Scott 2005; 
2007a: 301-326).  Often asserting not merely consonance but virtual identity between 
the core content of kastom and the divine revelation contained in biblical religion, 
these projects regularly represent the God of the Bible as the true source of the 
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ringeringe (way/custom) of each matrilineage in its land.  Implicit in Arosi discourses 
about such ringeringe is the claim that, whereas God revealed his will to Israel and 
Euro-Americans through Moses and the prophets, the Incarnation and the apostolic 
tradition, he gave the Makiran matrilineages equal access to knowledge of his will 
through endemic qualities, powers, and allegorical messages placed in their territories 
(cf. Rose 1996: 41-42). 
Such claims to separate but equal kastom revelations can further seem to 
imply, however, that—local variations not withstanding—each territory-specific 
kastom duplicates all others in at least some respects if each is the repository of God’s 
eternal universal way.  Some Arosi make this explicit, saying that God mediated his 
ringeringe to Makirans, not through a code of norms and practices handed down from 
on high, but through Makira as a whole in the form of an essential, primordial, 
indelible quality—‘a good way of living’ (baronga goro)—that inheres in all things 
that have arisen in Makira, including the autochthonous progenitors themselves.  This 
Makira-specific good way of living is thus the common inheritance of all 
autochthonous matrilineages, and, relative to it, the plurality of territory-specific 
kastom can begin to appear epiphenomenal. 
In tension with Arosi representations of multiple ontologically disparate 
autochthonous categories, this interpretation can suggest that, just as the island and 
autochthony convey a common core kastom, they may also convey a common core 
ontology as well.  Few Arosi attend to this tension, however, or to the fact that the 
notion of an island-wide good way of living can subordinate territory-specific kastom 
to higher levels of insular and universal kastom.  Rather, many articulate ethno-
theological constructions according to which God both placed his way in the island 
and made the matrilineages the special caretakers of distinctive versions of this way 
in their territories.  In these both/and understandings, the plurality of territory-specific 
kastom is subtly encompassed within nested scales of divine revelation, but it is not 
lost. 
Most non-SDA ethno-theological constructions portray the ancestral powers 
respected in the pre-Christian past as having been God’s deputies, whose primary role 
was to make known and enforce lineage and territory-specific ringeringe through 
signs, including retribution for infractions.  Today many Arosi continue to regard 
these ancestors, known as adaro, as powerful moral agents enshrined in the land, who 
will defend the persons and customary privileges of their descendants vis-à-vis 
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strangers in their territory.  Even in the early 1990s some people described these 
ancestral presences to me in military or para-military terms, explaining that they 
operate like radar systems or immigration control officers to police their territories 
and protect their descendants from potentially usurping or violating encroachments.  
Adaro, in other words, manifest kastom as the unique, God-given nature and efficacy 
of each matrilineal category in its territory. 
It is important to emphasize that Arosi do not appear to conceive of the 
underground army as made up of, related to, or working in conjunction with ancestral 
adaro.  Furthermore, although many Arosi expect adaro to be active in the land, I 
have never heard Arosi describe ancestors as carrying on an afterlife existence 
underground (but see Fox 1924: 234, 285).  Nevertheless, analytically speaking, since 
the height of the ‘tension’ it has been as if Arosi are re-imagining the Maasina Rule-
era idea of an underground town and its inhabitants as the insular-level analogue to 
their ancestral, territory-specific adaro.  As these powers are to their respective 
territories, the underground army is a guardian entity policing the integrity of 
Makira—conceptualized as ‘Motherland’—and the rights of true Makirans within a 
nation-state undergoing crisis and its aftermath. 
But the army is more than a border patrol.  Like the adaro, it is a source as 
well as the force behind a distinctive way of life that is not merely the ‘law of the 
land’ but the law in the land.  It is a bearer of kastom, according to accounts I 
garnered, in three related ways at once: it is the embodiment of true Makiran kastom 
because its personnel, like the kakamora with whom they are allied, enact and model 
true Makiran kastom in their language and behaviour; it is the physical locus of true 
Makiran kastom as a power concentrated at the core of the island; and it is the means 
by which true Makiran kastom will be restored to the surface.  It is, in other words, a 
figure of kastom as a manifestation of the unique, God-given nature and efficacy of 
the island of Makira as a whole.7 
This situation is both similar to and different from the one David Akin (2005) 
describes as prevalent—also since Maasina Rule—among the mountain Kwaio of 
Malaita, who have adamantly rejected Christianity.  In an incisive contribution to 
recent debates on kastom and ‘the invention of tradition’, Akin analyzes the processes 
whereby kastom discourses have reconfigured Kwaio relations with their ancestors, 
demonstrating that kastom is cultural: the transformer and the transformed (cf. Sahlins 
1999).  He shows how kastom discourses preoccupied with codifying taboos 
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regulating women’s bodily functions—a generic scale of kastom impinging on every 
household and an apt symbolic site at which mountain Kwaio as an embattled social 
body seek to regulate their boundaries with others—has foregrounded a generic 
category of pan-mountain Kwaio ancestors not previously salient in Kwaio moral 
consciousness: 
 
In the past, there was no conception of a single ‘Kwaio religion’ across the 
area.  Rather, distinctive composites of ancestral spirits and their taboos 
distinguished individuals and communities across the region, highlighting 
diversity, division, and structures of complex cross-cutting linkages rather 
than any overall unity.  They still do this.  But today ‘The Ancestors’ as an 
undifferentiated group have also come to symbolize the whole of mountain 
Kwaio society, a social entity that had no conscious existence as such until the 
colonial era.  (Akin 2005: 199; cf. Burt 1982; 1994: 215; Naitoro 1993: 130-
132) 
 
Rather than as ancestors, who remain for Arosi icons of essential matrilineal 
and territorial difference, Arosi figure the character and active power of pan-Makiran 
kastom as an underground army.  But despite this difference, as with ‘The Ancestors’ 
in relation to the mountain Kwaio, it might well be said that this army ‘symbolizes’ an 
insular Makiran identity, an identity that may have had little or no ‘conscious 
existence as such until the colonial era’ and that is still very much in the making 
within the social and political dynamics of the neo-colonial multi-ethnic nation-state 
(cf. Keesing 1989: 21).  At the same time, however, from the point of view of those 
Arosi who engage with it, the image of the army offers more than a Makiran identity 
to be worn before others.  It suggests a living kastom that is increasingly presumed to 
arise from their literal ground of being—underpinning their still important but now 
potentially subordinated matrilineal selves—even as it impinges on them as an 
overarching insular power with which they interact. 
 
Kastom politics as ontology politics 
This is to say that, within the incipient category of Makiran-ness, the relationship 
between kastom and agency is developing as a scaled-up analogue to the relationship 
between territory-specific ringeringe and agency long modelled as operative within 
each matrilineal category.  For many Arosi today, Makiran kastom is part of the 
essential nature of all true Makirans; it is a power that inheres in them in the same 
way that it inheres in all things autochthonous to their island: stones, endemic species, 
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non-ancestral ‘wild’ adaro, apical ancestral entities, kakamora, and now the 
underground.  At any time, therefore, Makiran kastom may become manifest through 
the agency of any of these forms, at any of these interactive and co-conditioning 
scales. 
Most Makirans presume that the kastom active in them is essentially other vis-
à-vis the multiple forms of kastom active in people from other islands or regions; 
some Makirans, furthermore presume that their distinctive kastom entails—even 
demands—a kastom politics that is, more fundamentally, an ontology politics.  This 
can consist in two key assumptions: first, that any truly autochthonous person of the 
island, regardless of his or her mastery of kastom as received tradition, has the 
potential to become an authoritative source of a living, renewable kastom; and second, 
that such a person is to be preferred—indeed, is preferred by the island—to hold, or at 
least discern who should hold, positions of power impinging on Makira.  Such 
confidence in an essential affinity between a true person of the island and Makiran 
kastom does not depend on engagement with the figure of the underground, however.  
It informs other kastom revival discourses and initiatives as well.  Accordingly, in this 
section I elaborate how this political theory is evident both beyond and in relation to 
ideas about the underground in ways that are shaping Arosi participation in 
democratic processes at every level of government. 
The most explicit formulations of a Makiran politics of ontology that I 
encountered arose in connection with the imminent implementation of a political 
innovation known as the New Community Governance Regime 2006 (cf. Alasia 2008: 
140).  This Regime, in brief, comprises a set of ordinances for the creation and 
coordination of a complex range of village, ward, and provincial councils, authorities, 
and programmes.  Among other things, it provides for every electoral ward to 
empower a Ward Council of Chiefs and to send one Ward Chief to serve on a Great 
Council of Chiefs in an advisory capacity to the existing Provincial Assembly.  It was 
the inauguration of this Regime, in fact, that stood directly behind the preparations for 
a Chiefs Empowerment Day referred to in the Solomon Times Online news brief 
quoted above. 
Ontology politics came to the surface when people, who to my knowledge 
have no particular interest in the figure of the underground, shared their views on how 
this Regime should be put into practice.  One man, for example, expressed to me his 
concern that the people put forward to serve on the Ward Councils of Chiefs 
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prescribed by the Regime ought exclusively to be sae auhenua, people who can trace 
their descent from the putatively autochthonous matrilineages of the island.  Ideally, 
they should be like him: ‘true’ (ha‘amori)—by which he meant descended from such 
exogamous matrilineages through both mother and father.  This man has been making 
a study of kastom with older Arosi for many years and is a clerk on a local ‘custom 
court’ that is attempting to recruit younger members and train them in kastom 
knowledge.  Yet for him, such acquired knowledge alone cannot qualify one to judge 
kastom matters.  Only a sae auhenua, he said, has the gentle, accommodating, and 
mild disposition necessary to respect, understand, and uphold Makiran kastom 
properly.8  Similarly, another man, who spoke at a village workshop devoted to 
explaining how the Regime would work (see further discussion of this meeting below) 
argued that the Great Council of Chiefs ought to have veto power over acts of the 
Provincial Assembly on the following grounds: 
 
We want to bring back to life the auhenua [autochthonous] government.  So if 
the Provincial Assembly passes a bill that does not follow the will of the 
island, the Great Council of Chiefs should have veto power.  These [chiefs] 
are the auhenua of the island. 
 
This idea that an auhenua person can be a conduit of ‘the will of the island’ 
constitutes, I suggest, a kind of kastom mysticism—a term I employ, not in a 
pejorative or dismissive sense, but in a specific analytical sense to denote an 
orientation to kastom as integral to one’s own being.  Makiran kastom mysticism is 
literal identity politics: the political privileging of one who enjoys identity of being 
with Makira.  The concept of the true person of the island, in other words, is as much 
a figure of the agency of kastom as the underground or kakamora.  Such a person is 
another site, at the most intimate scale, where kastom lies hidden but can never die 
out.  Because kastom is a quality and a way of being that was instilled by God in the 
island at its inception, it pervades all things Makiran and is always potentially 
available for fresh elicitations and personal epiphanies (cf. Bonnemaison 1994: 322-
323).9 
Clearly, the figure of the underground army is not indispensable to or 
definitive of the Makiran mystical quest for reunion with lost kastom.  Rather, as a 
figure nearly congruent with the scale of the island as a whole, it is a point of 
reference through which Makirans can experience kastom as an encompassing stream 
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of being in which they live and move and have their being, and which lives and 
moves and has its being in them.  The army is both out there to be encountered and 
viscerally, intuitively linked to the true Makiran by virtue of this continuous closed 
ontological loop.  An apt Arosi paraphrasing of a mystical reading of Luke 17:21 
might be ‘the underground is within you’. 
To illustrate this point and further develop what I mean by kastom mysticism, 
I turn now to the case of one Arosi man who told me that he is considering standing 
for election to the national parliament in order to serve what he understands to be the 
underground army’s peace-making agenda.  Identifying himself as ‘a true person of 
Makira’, he suggested that his political ambitions are inspired by a sense of vocation 
from God and Makira, mediated through the agency of the underground with which 
he hopes eventually to communicate.  My interlocutor in this instance was a young 
Anglican in his thirties from north-east Arosi who had been working for seven years 
in Honiara when I met and interviewed him there. 
Our conversation took place on the evening of what has become known as 
‘Black Tuesday’—April 18, 2006—the day Honiara’s Chinatown was burned and 
looted following the announcement of a new national government (Alasia 2008; Allen 
2008; Kabutaulaka and Kabutaulaka 2007).  In this context, which seemed to threaten 
a return to violent civil ‘tension’, this man confided his conviction that Makira holds 
the answer to the problem of civil discord in Solomon Islands.  ‘We people of Makira 
can sort out the lasting peace in Solomon Islands’, he said.  ‘Makira can do that.  I 
believe this strongly, because we people of Makira are peacemakers.’ 
When I asked him how Makira could bring peace, he began circuitously to 
approach the topic of the underground.  Eventually he answered that on Makira ‘we 
have a strange thing, like a mamaani usuri (a handed-down account of supposed 
actual events); people call it bahai nai ano (the underground).’  Then he cautioned: 
 
[B]ut it is very sensitive, Scott.  It is very sensitive, as I’ve told you.  It is my 
culture (kalsa), it is my culture, it is our security.  So when I like to tell the 
whole story I don’t feel comfortable, because it is an international global base 
and I think it stands ready for things to come in the future. 
 
The future this man anticipates is ‘another tension’, ‘another crisis’.  But there 
will not be ‘another RAMSI to come’, he predicted.  Rather, ‘there is a peacemaker 
already here in Solomon Islands’ that will be more efficacious than RAMSI; the 
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underground army will emerge and succeed finally in bringing order to Solomon 
Islands. 
The army will succeed, he suggested, because it has harnessed the power of 
the true Makiran kastom that is synonymous with the kakamora.  ‘I think they use the 
kakamora’, he said.  ‘That’s the only power they’re using.’  He soon went on to 
equate the kakamora with the ‘culture’ of Makira: ‘I say Makira is a special island.  
Most provinces have their own culture, but we Makirans have kakamora.’  They ‘hold 
the real kastom of Makira.’  It is this man’s theory that the white people in the 
underground are Europeans who have ‘adopted’ this culture.  Like the kakamora, 
therefore, they are now endowed with special abilities.  They are in control of ‘strong 
power’.  They can ‘disappear and appear’.  And they have become ‘very wise’; they 
know the true Makiran kastom that alone, according to this man, can end disputes and 
bring lasting peace to the Solomons. 
Before this can happen, however, a leader who is ‘truly from Makira’ must 
prepare the island for its role as peacemaker by helping Makirans recover their true 
kastom.  The Europeans in the underground have adopted true Makiran kastom, and 
now—as this man put it—‘it becomes active to them.’  Then he added: ‘But not to us, 
because we have a different culture; we don’t know kastom.  We’re all over the place 
now.  So, we have to go back to the original culture which they live according to.’  If 
Makirans return to their kastom, he claimed, it will become a source of power for 
them as well; they will become like the underground army and the kakamora.  Makira 
will then be ready to take its rightful place as benevolent leader and peace-keeping 
‘Motherland’ to the rest of the Solomons. 
To this end, this man contemplates whether he might be the leader Makira 
requires, even though he acknowledges that he is not well versed in Makiran kastom.  
‘I’m very young and I want to learn kastom’, he told me, ‘but I can’t, because I have a 
job.’  He is very disturbed by his own theory that Europeans working with the 
kakamora in the underground have accessed the power of this kastom, while he and 
other Makirans have lost it.  At the same time, however, he credits himself as ‘a 
person of Makira’ with special powers of insight and prognostication and seems to 
regard being ‘truly from Makira’ as the chief asset he needs in order to lead Makira to 
kastom revival.  Moreover, the kastom revival he envisions will rely not only on the 
knowledge of ‘old people’, many of whom have ‘lost the original culture’, but also on 
the experiences of younger Makirans—such as a cousin of his, to whom, he says, the 
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powers at work in the underground are already revealing kastom anew.  Thus, in spite 
of his youth and ignorance, and on the strength of such signs of spontaneous renewal, 
he intends, he told me, to seek a seat in parliament at the next general election and to 
campaign on a platform of kastom restoration. 
His plans were still in the making, however.  He was not yet sure what the 
underground wants him to do.  He was looking for ‘evidence’, for a sign from the 
underground that his interpretation of the situation in the Solomons is correct.  He 
said he wanted to return to Makira first to look into it, literally, and seemed confident 
that the army would admit him.  ‘It will show me a signal directly, and then I’ll know 
what to do and how to go about it.’ 
In the months prior to my interview with this man, I had been resident in Arosi 
during the campaigning and polling for the April 5, 2006 general election that 
eventuated in ‘Black Tuesday’.  In that context, too, I found that the figure of the 
underground was a focus for kastom mysticism underpinning some people’s 
participation in democratic processes, but with significantly different potential 
implications for ontology politics.  Attending campaign events and speaking with 
voters, I learned that some Arosi were reading the platforms of various candidates in 
terms of their own speculations and hopes regarding the underground.  But these 
voters were scrutinizing candidates not so much for their supposed Makiran ontology 
quotient, as for signs that they might—either with or without their own knowledge—
be instruments of the underground’s larger purposes.  Their kastom mysticism lay, not 
in insisting that their future MP be a true person of the island (or in aspiring to stand 
for office themselves), but in taking it upon themselves to discern signs of who might 
be the army’s chosen means of advancing the destiny of Makira.  They looked for 
supposed allegorical correspondences between aspects of various candidates or their 
rhetoric and elements of well-known Arosi folktales, interpretations of Arosi place 
names, distinctive Makiran landmarks such as caves associated with the kakamora or 
the many distinctive limestone formations suggestive of meaningful forms in the 
vicinity of the ‘door’ to the underground at Rohu.  Some voters, for example, 
understood the terms of one candidate’s agenda for kastom revitalization as 
containing messages that, if elected, the candidate would work to advance the time 
when the original kastom of Makira preserved by the kakamora would re-emerge. 
Such acceptance of the possibility that someone whose Makiran ontology 
might be cast into doubt could nevertheless serve the underground army and the cause 
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of Makiran kastom doubtlessly owes something to biblical narratives that depict God 
making use of the nations to further his plans for Israel (e.g. Isaiah 45:1-7).  At the 
same time, this approach to choosing a leader likewise appears consonant with 
ethnographic evidence and ongoing understandings regarding how chiefs were chosen 
in the past (Fox 1924: 181-190; cf. Scott 2000; 2007a: 75-82).  A traditional chief 
exercised authority over a polity comprising multiple exogamous matrilineages, but 
situated on land putatively held by the burunga i auhenua, the one matrilineage 
uniquely autochthonous to that particular territory.  But such a chief was not 
necessarily a member of the matrilineage on whose land he managed inter-lineage 
sociality.  His authority to administer the ringeringe auhenua of that place rested on 
an analogous presupposition that the burunga i auhenua, as agents of their specific 
ringeringe, could anoint a non-auhenua chief who would follow the will of their land 
for the benefit of everyone settled in it. 
Additionally, beyond the context of the ballot box, evidence that the figure of 
the underground is mediating kastom mysticism in Arosi political life is also legible in 
the expectations with which some Makirans, as reported in the Solomon Times Online, 
awaited the Chiefs Empowerment Day in August 2007.  The anticipation surrounding 
this event suggests that some kastom mystics were operating with the assumption that 
the army will respond to political measures that realize elements of its kastom 
restoration and regional-autonomy agenda for Makira.  Again, this perspective looks 
familiar; it resembles some forms of biblical messianism.  Just as some forms of 
biblical messianism assert that the messiah will come only after human beings have 
actively prepared the way by returning to strict observance of God’s law, so some 
Makirans appear to regard the raising of kastom, especially the empowerment of 
chiefs, to be incumbent on human agency as a necessary precondition for the 
epiphany of the army.  As the Chiefs Empowerment Day drew near, some people 
seemed, in fact, to entertain the possibility that the simple act of installing neo-
customary leaders could summon forth the agents of the underground.  But more 
fundamentally, this perspective is consistent with an ontology politics according to 
which the Makiran person and the underground army can work in tandem as different 
modalities of a unified category of being qua field of agency to bring about the 
resurgence of Makiran kastom.  By giving political allegiance to those policies that 
promise to ‘bring back to life the auhenua government’—wherever and by whomever 
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they may be initiated—the Makiran kastom mystic can quietly understand her or 
himself to be hastening the advent of the army and the fulfilment of Makiran destiny. 
 
Politician J: the underground army across centre and periphery 
Shortly after it appeared, the news item quoted at the opening of this chapter 
prompted several unverifiable assertions, posted to an online platform, that a certain 
well-known Arosi politician had been among those ‘senior citizens’ who had actively 
promoted ‘belief’ in a ‘secret provincial army’.  It is not my aim here to prove these 
assertions true or false.  Rather, by examining data from my field research that tend 
towards affirmation of these assertions, my aim is to offer a concluding case study of 
a person whose instrumentalist, yet perhaps equally essentialist, engagement with the 
figure of the underground appears to be motivating political innovations that are 
impinging on the configuration of the Solomon Islands nation-state.  Highlighting 
recent phases in the career of this politician—whom I call Politician J—I trace how he 
has tacked back and forth between national and grassroots politics, enlisting the centre 
to facilitate the goals of the periphery and working from the top down to allow 
Makiran kastom gradually to emerge, quite literally, from the ground up. 
Politician J stood for a seat in the Solomon Islands national parliament in the 
2000 West Makira by-election that followed the death of Solomon S. Mamaloni 
(1943-2000) and again in the general election of 2001.  Ex post facto data that I 
collected in 2003 pertaining to these elections indicate that Politician J and his 
supporters campaigned on a platform that closely associated Politician J with the 
underground army.  Regarding who exactly articulated these associations—Politician 
J himself or only his supporters—I heard conflicting accounts.  One of my Arosi 
consultants said he had heard Politician J openly claim to be able to tap into the power 
of the underground.  Another consultant, however—a man who says that Politician J 
and his supporters had frequently solicited him for his vote—told me that, although 
Politician J did not make overt references to the underground, his supporters did so 
regularly in one-on-one asides to voters.  When I interviewed some of these same 
supporters, their accounts of what they had said corroborated on many points the 
accounts of those whose votes they had been seeking to secure. 
Some of this politician’s supporters, for example, had likened Mamaloni and 
their candidate to Moses and Joshua (hence, ‘Politician J’) as men whose successive 
leadership would bring Makira out of the crisis of the civil ‘tension’—understood as a 
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period of bondage under Malaitans equivalent to the bondage of Israel in Egypt—and 
into peaceful prosperity as a Promised Land.10  While he was in office, they had said, 
Mamaloni had smuggled money and weapons to the underground as a ‘preparation’ 
that would serve as a defence against Malaitan encroachment and a foundation for 
Makiran development.  They had furthermore intimated that Mamaloni is not really 
dead, but has gone to the underground where he sits enthroned as ‘King Solomon’ at 
the head of the army.  The implication was that, just as Joshua had succeeded Moses, 
Politician J, if elected, would succeed Mamaloni and, garnering the stored wealth of 
the ‘preparation’, establish ‘Makira State’ as the ‘Motherland’ from which blessings 
would flow to the whole Solomons archipelago. 
After a brief period in national office, Politician J next secured election to the 
Makira/Ulawa Provincial Assembly where he became one of the principal architects 
of the previously mentioned New Community Governance Regime 2006.  While the 
Regime was still in the process of development and approval, the newly elected Prime 
Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, launched his ‘Bottom-Up Approach’, a policy designed 
to involve grassroots communities in governance and development through the 
devolution of ‘powers, functions and decision making to the periphery’ (Sogavare 
2006; see also Alasia 2008: 137; Kabutaulaka and Kabutaulaka 2007: 602).  As 
indicated above, the New Community Governance Regime allowed for local 
communities to revive traditional forms of leadership and customary practices by 
means of a two-tiered system of chiefs’ councils comprising multiple Ward Councils 
of Chiefs feeding a single Great Council of Chiefs with direct access to the Provincial 
Assembly.  While seeking support for the Regime, Politician J and others had 
explicitly promoted it as in line with Sogavare’s national policy.11  Then, throughout 
mid to late 2006, once the Regime had been slated for ‘gazetting’ and was about to be 
implemented, Politician J, together with another prominent provincial politician, made 
a tour of their constituencies and held a series of workshops to explain this ‘bottom-
up’ scheme to grassroots elders and village leaders. 
I attended one such workshop in the north-west Arosi village of Heuru in 
September 2006.  The meeting was chaired by Politician J’s associate.  He opened 
with an explanation of how the Regime was—among other things—a framework for 
allowing communities to identify ‘traditional leaders’ according to their own criteria 
and for positioning these leaders as a ‘consultative link’ between the people and the 
Provincial Assembly.  The purpose of this scheme, he said, was to ‘make kastom 
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grow back so that our identity will always be here, and then we will look for 
development.’  Referring to a diagram chalked on a blackboard, he laid out the basic 
structure of the Regime.  Speaking of the Ward Councils of Chiefs, he elaborated that 
their ‘most important’ work would be to ‘coordinate genealogies and the kastom 
belonging to the ward, to straighten lineage and tribal rights, revive good kastom, and 
write every kastom, even if it isn’t a good one, because it reflects our identity.’  As for 
the Great Council of Chiefs, it would have only an advisory function vis-à-vis the 
Provincial Assembly.  He acknowledged that the plan was not ‘perfect’, but indicated 
that the chiefs would ‘later be given more responsibilities and more entitlements.’ 
A day-long discussion ensued.  Then, acting as vice-chair, Politician J stood 
up and offered a closing statement that amounted to the reportage of a portentous 
sign.  He observed that, ‘one of our leaders for this vision’ died ‘on the third day … 
after the announcement [of the Regime] had been made.’  But before he died, the 
leader had made this pronouncement: ‘I go now, but what is taking place … is what I 
wanted.  Children work to see its fruition.’  Intensifying this message, Politician J 
concluded with: ‘So we have to nurture and mature it to see its fruits.’ 
With these remarks Politician J was, I suggest, indirectly referring back to and 
developing remarks made by another workshop participant.  Spokesmen for the 
participants from the two electoral wards involved had just given their summary 
responses to the workshop, and in this context a leading man from one ward had said: 
 
It is a historic day for us. … It has been the cry of our forefathers.  Maasina 
Rule isn’t something to make fun of; it was the beginning of what this 
workshop is about.  But the colonial government stamped down on them, and 
some of our relatives died in prison.  I want to pay tribute to them.  Thank you 
for coming to do the workshop.  We highly value this workshop. 
 
The phrase ‘the cry of our forefathers’ functioned subtly to compare the Maasina Rule 
period, in which some movement leaders were imprisoned, to the period of Israel’s 
bondage in Egypt (cf. Exodus 3:7; 6:5).  When the speaker then paid tribute to these 
leaders, this parallelism suggested that, like Moses and other prophets of Israel, they 
had foreseen and laid the foundations for liberating transformations that would come 
only after they were gone.  Heightening this theme, Politician J’s closing remarks 
implicitly cast the leader who had recently died as the last prophet of the Maasina 
Rule era whose death and blessing of the future marked the closing of an old era of 
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preparation and looked forward to a new era of fruition.12  Like Moses (Deuteronomy 
33-34) and Simeon (Luke 2:25-35), this leader stands at the threshold of fulfilment, 
glimpsing it and commending it to the care of others before making his exit.  
Reiterating the same providential history narrated in his supporters’ construal of 
himself as Joshua in relationship to Mamaloni as Moses, Politician J was presenting 
himself and the other architects of the Regime as heirs to the vision of the Maasina 
Rule leaders, ready to take Makira into the next phase of a divinely ordained destiny. 
Such a providential reading of events, alone, is not proof that Politician J 
hopes that the underground army will intervene to secure the destiny of Makira.  It is 
possible that he was simply seeking to encourage popular take-up of the Regime by 
infusing it with a sense of sacred gravitas.  At the same time, however, he would have 
been aware that some listeners would make a connection between this providential 
reading of history and expectations about the underground army.  He was addressing 
‘those who have ears to hear’ and inviting them to read the underground into his 
remarks.  It is significant, I think, that when I spoke with him during a break in the 
workshop, he told me that he hopes one day to take a higher degree; his proposed 
thesis topic, he said, is ‘the wisdom of the kakamora’. 
Almost a year later the imminent crowning, via a Chiefs Empowerment Day, 
of what Politician J had termed ‘this vision’ briefly brought national attention to 
Makira, not only as the locus of strange rumours, but also as the seat of one of many 
sporadically active secessionist movements in Solomon Islands and beyond.  ‘Makira 
Ulawa Province has been, over the past few years, calling for independence from the 
rest of Solomon Islands’, writes Ralph Sao (2007).  ‘It is still unclear,’ he continues, 
‘whether this idea of a secret army has anything to do with its desire to secede.’  But 
what exactly is unclear to this journalist?  Astutely, Sao seems to suspect a connection 
between a secret provincial army and the Makiran will to secede.  Might such an 
otherwise logical connection be rendered unclear because the expectation that the 
army will arrive on the occasion of the installation of neo-customary chiefs seems so 
inappropriate?  Is it not the case, Sao may be assuming, that such concessions to local 
kastom are supposed to strengthen national cohesion, not dismantle it?  Why would a 
secessionist army appear just at the moment of local kastom recognition? 
There is indeed something wrong with this picture according to the wisdom 
that has guided much national response to local autonomy movements.  As in other 
Melanesian contexts, in Solomon Islands, calls for independence from several island 
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groups go back to the period of preparation for decolonization and have continued 
intermittently (Premdas, Steeves, and Larmour 1983; Standish 1979).  Such calls were 
renewed during the crisis of the civil ‘tension’ at the turn of the millennium, and a 
number of provinces, including Makira/Ulawa, declared their intentions to secede 
from the nation-state.  In response to these centrifugal pulls, the national government 
has sought to contain regional autonomy movements by expediting previously 
proposed plans to implement a federal system with various forms of devolved 
government (Moore 2004: 156-160; Nanau 2002; Scales 2007: 204-209). 
But the seeming misfit between expectations of a secessionist army in 
conjunction with such devolution measures, supports the view that this model of 
opposite-tending central and peripheral pulls and goals, while accurate to some extent, 
does not tell the whole story.  In this instance, it might appear that state- and elite-
sanctioned initiatives to strengthen the nation-state by reviving ‘traditional’ 
chiefship—conceived of as a primordially unifying pan-Solomons cultural heritage 
with local variations (LiPuma 1997; cf. Babadzan 1988: 211)—inadvertently revealed 
that some Makirans thought reformation of specifically Makiran forms of chiefship 
might, to the contrary, mobilize the Makiran underground army to lead their province 
to independence.  As the trajectory of Politician J confirms, however, it is impossible 
to separate the national from the provincial agendas at work here, or even the 
provincial-level agendas from those of ‘grassroots’ communities (cf. White 1997).  
The centres of government often include people from village communities—such as 
Politician J—some of whom may have sought power in the centres precisely in order 
to further visions of separatism informed by local elements and icons of kastom—
such as the figure of the underground army—in the name of visions of greater 
national cohesion through federalism or the creation of laws and institutions that 
respect kastom plurality.  Seemingly top-down, stabilizing, ideologically ‘secular’ 
agendas can conveniently camouflage—and more importantly may better be 
understood as having been shaped by—grassroots agendas with literally eccentric 
aims. 
The pathways and policies of Politician J appear to constitute this reality.  The 
political innovation of the New Community Governance Regime 2006 and the 
rumours that preceded the Chiefs Empowerment Day to which it gave rise were the 
outcomes, I suggest, of just such a complex mix of representations and objectives.  
They were the products of a partially hidden, partially revealed ontology politics that 
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is enlisting the state in the quests of local kastom mystics and inscribing the quests of 
local kastom mystics on the state. 
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Endnotes 
 
1.  There appear to be many parallels between this transformation and the emergence 
of a distinction between kalsa and kastam in Manus Province (Papua New Guinea), as 
analyzed by Dalsgaard and Otto (this volume).  Although I do not detect a similar 
differential use of the Solomon Islands Pijin terms kalsa and kastom among Arosi, 
there is nevertheless a tension, comparable to that between kalsa and kastam in 
Manus, between invocations of pan-Makiran kastom and the demands of matrilineal 
and territory-specific kastom.  I would emphasize, however, that the ongoing tension 
in Arosi lies as much between two experiences of ontology as ‘between two types of 
morality’. 
 
2.  For accounts and analyses of Maasina Rule, see Burt 1994; Keesing 1978; Laracy 
1983; Naitoro 1993; Scott 2007a. 
 
3.  The following paragraphs build on the analysis of the relationship among land, 
lineages, and ontology as laid out in Scott 2007a; cf. 2007b. 
 
4.  Arosi use the Arosi word ringeringe and the Pijin word kastom interchangeably.  
By my observation, however, people of north and east Arosi tend to prefer ringeringe, 
while people of south and west Arosi are perhaps more likely to say kastom, even in 
Arosi language speech. 
 
5.  It is within this level of the matrilineal and territory-specific category of being that 
the model of the Melanesian person as ‘fractal’ (e.g. Wagner 1991) or as a ‘partible’ 
‘dividual’ (e.g. Strathern 1988) undergoing constant processes of ‘decomposition’ 
(e.g. Mosko 1992) is most unambiguously applicable to Arosi sociality.  Despite 
evidence of the increasing social relevance of a pan-Makiran ontological category, 
however, it should not be assumed without qualification that Arosi view their 
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matrilineal and territory-specific categories as similarly precipitated out of an always 
already composite pleroma of relationships.  Rather, within the recent ethnographic 
past at least, Arosi poly-ontology has tended to put the primordial categorical parts 
before any socio-cosmic completeness (see Scott 2007a; 2007b). 
 
6.  Arosi began accepting the Anglican Christianity of the Melanesian Mission in the 
1850s.  The South Sea Evangelical Mission (now SSEC) established its first school in 
Arosi in the early 1900s.  Arosi SDA consultants recalled that men from the western 
Solomons and Guadalcanal introduced their denomination to Arosi in the mid to late 
1930s. 
 
7.  There is an important exception to this assertion.  In Arosi 2 I interviewed a locally 
well-known SDA woman, who says she has been approached by the underground 
army and that it is the army of Satan.  As I hope to explore elsewhere, this inversion 
of the moral value assigned to the army may be correlated with the fact that, relative 
to their Anglican and SSEC neighbours, most SDA Arosi maintain a negative 
orientation towards kastom and many things associated with the pre-Christian past.  
Accordingly, this woman experiences the army as trying to ‘get her’, or win her for 
Satan, much as she sees aspects of kastom as pre-Christian error with which Satan 
formerly deceived her ancestors and into which she might be tempted to lapse. 
 
8.  The distinction made here between Makiran kastom as a received body of 
traditions and Makiran kastom as a general moral quality or disposition should not be 
read as the anthropological distinction between kastom as knowledge (Gegeo 1994) 
and kastom as ‘contentless symbol’ (Keesing 1982: 299).  Several of my consultants 
differentiated between kastom as various forms of transmissible knowledge and 
kastom as ‘good character’ or ‘a good way of being’.  They tended furthermore to 
treat the latter as an indispensable underpinning to the former. 
 
9.  According to lineage origin narratives I learned in the early 1990s, kakamora are 
simply one among several types of originary beings.  Yet contemporary Arosi 
discourses appear increasingly to assimilate all apical progenitors to shape-shifting 
kakamora under alternative forms (e.g. rocks, snakes, endemic species), implying that 
all true Makirans are in some sense the descendants of kakamora.  Given this 
conflation of originary beings into the one autochthonous Makiran category of 
kakamora, it could be said that, for Makirans, the new insular kastom mysticism is 
about getting in touch with your inner kakamora. 
 
10.  This comparison of Mamaloni to Moses reflects the unparalleled local importance 
of Mamaloni as an Arosi person who achieved national and international prominence.  
Before Solomon Islands became independent in 1978, he served as the first Chief 
Minister (1974-1976); after independence, he was Prime Minister for three periods 
(1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1997).  At the time of his death in January 2000, he 
was one of only two people to have held the seat for West Makira since the formation 
of the constituency.  Not all Arosi view Mamaloni in this unequivocally positive light, 
yet even those critical or ambivalent about him reflect on his career as something 
phenomenal indicative of larger forces at work with as yet uncertain consequences for 
Makira. 
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11.  This intertwining of national and provincial initiatives also marked the eventual 
celebration of the Chiefs Empowerment Day on August 17, 2007.  By invitation from 
the province, Sogavare attended the celebration, at which he commended the 
provincial government’s initiative as ‘the essence of sustainable development that is 
driven from bottom-up’ (Solomon Islands Government 2007).  At this event Sogavare 
himself was installed as an honorary paramount chief of Makira (Solomon Islands 
Broadcasting Corporation 2007).  It is possible that some Makirans, contemplating 
these proceedings, interpreted Sogavare’s words and participation as tantamount to 
signs of approbation from the underground army, despite its failure to materialize.  It 
is widely known that Sogavare claims to have had conversation with Mamaloni since 
Mamaloni’s death in 2000 (Sasako 2001, 2007).  Many Makirans take this as 
evidence in support of the theory that Mamaloni is not really dead, and some may 
furthermore speculate that Sogavare’s supposed meeting with the post-mortem 
Mamaloni indicates that Sogavare—although an SDA member from Choiseul—is an 
instrument of the army’s agenda. 
 
12.  I was unable to confirm the identity of this recently deceased leader, but it is 
likely that it was either Talman Mona‘aro, who died on July 13, 2006, or Kerehote, 
who died on August 27, 2006.  Both men were among those Makiran Maasina Rule 
leaders, alluded to earlier in the workshop, who had been imprisoned in Honiara 
during the movement.  Mona‘aro had furthermore been injured in a notorious truck 
accident that killed two of his fellow Makiran inmates en route to a prison-labour site 
on December 24, 1949; a third Makiran died later owing to complications arising 
from his injuries. 
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